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Hardening GitHub Actions Against Outside Threats

中文摘要

2025-2026年的供应链攻击通过GitHub Actions在发布过程中向合法软件包注入恶意代码,而非通过恶意源代码或拼写错误攻击。

English Summary

Supply chain attacks are compromising legitimate packages by injecting malicious code during GitHub Actions release processes, rather than through malicious source code or typosquatting.

Original Excerpt

The supply chain attacks that defined 2025 and 2026 did not arrive as typosquats or as newly published malicious packages. They arrived inside legitimate, widely installed packages whose maintainers wrote no malicious code. The malicious code entered during the release, and in most cases the release ran on GitHub Actions. Some of the better-known incidents on widely used projects, as a sample rather than a complete list: tj-actions/changed-files, March 2025 Nx s1ngularity, August 2025 Shai-Hulud, from September 2025 trivy-action, March 2026 axios, March 2026 TanStack Router, May 2026 GhostAction, across 2025 and 2026 LiteLLM 1.107.0, October 2026 A recurring pattern was compromise of the release process or its credentials. In some incidents, attackers made the project's own automation build and ship the malicious artifact, as in Ultralytics and TanStack Router. In others, they stole publishing credentials from that automation and published directly—Nx's postmortem explicitly states that the malicious packages did not originate from its CI pipeline. These paths require different controls, but share an outcome: malicious code distributed under the project's established package identi…